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Hegel, Spinoza, and McTaggart on the
Reality of Time
“Nun haben die Sirenen eine noch schrecklichere Waffe als den Gesang, nämlich ihr
Schweigen”¹
Abstract. In this paper, I study one aspect of the philosophical encounter between
Spinoza and Hegel: the question of the reality of time. The precise reconstruction of
the debate will require a close examination of Spinoza’s concept of tempus (time)
and duratio (duration), and Hegel’s understanding of these notions. Following a
presentation of Hegel’s perception of Spinoza as a modern Eleatic, who denies
the reality of time, change and plurality, I turn, in the second part, to look closely
at Spinoza’s text and show that Hegel was wrong in reading Spinoza as denying the
reality of duration and change. Ironically, Hegel’s misreading of Spinoza as deny-
ing the reality of duration and change has been compensated for by a reading of
Hegel as denying the reality of time by one of Hegel’s most prominent followers,
John Ellis McTaggart. I discuss McTaggart’s reading of Hegel’s Logic in the final
part of the paper.
In diesem Aufsatz wird ein Aspekt der philosophischen Auseinandersetzung von
Spinoza und Hegel studiert: die Frage der Realität der Zeit. Die präzise Rekon-
struktion benötigt eine Betrachtung von Spinozas Begriffen „Zeit“ (tempus) und
„Dauer“ (duratio) und von Hegels Verständnis dieser Begriffe. Hegels These folgend,
dass Spinoza ein moderner Eleate ist, der die Realität von Zeit, Veränderung und
Vielfalt leugnet, wird im zweiten Teil anhand von Spinozas Text gezeigt, dass Hegel
unrecht in der Behauptung hat, dass Spinoza die Realität von Dauer und Verän-
derung leugnet. Ironischer Weise wird die Spinoza fälschlicher Weise zugeschrie-
bene These der Leugnung von Dauer und Veränderung von einem seiner Nachfolger
Hegel selbst unterstellt, nämlich von John Ellis McTaggert. Hiermit beschäftigt sich
der letzte Teil des Aufsatzes.
 “Now the Sirens have a still more fatal weapon than their song, namely their silence” (Kafka,
Parables and Paradoxes, pp. 88–89).
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Introduction
Hegel’s numerous discussions of Spinoza are usually highly sympathetic and ap-
preciative. This of course does not mean that he was free from common Europe-
an prejudices of his day and that he did not associate Spinoza with a fictional
“Orient,”² i.e., another “night in which all cows” – Jewish, Muslim, and Bud-
dhist – “are black.” But Hegel’s cultural and religious prejudices are not the sub-
ject of this paper.³
Two clear indications of Hegel’s high regard for Spinoza are the fact that he
allots to Spinoza one of the longest and most detailed discussions in his Lectures
on the History of Philosophy, and his astounding pronouncement that “thought
must begin by placing itself at the standpoint of Spinozism; to be a follower
of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all philosophy.”⁴ Hegel is also
quite generous toward Spinoza in setting a pretty high bar for any adequate ref-
utation of Spinoza:
Effective [wahrhafte] refutation [of Spinozism] must infiltrate the opponents’ stronghold
and meet him on his own ground […]. The only possible refutation of Spinozism can
only consist, therefore, in first acknowledging its standpoint as essential and necessary
 See, for example, Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3, p. 252: “The profound
unity of [Spinoza’s] philosophy as it founds its expression in Europe […] all this is an echo from
Eastern lands.” Cf. Encyclopedia Logic, § 151, Addition, and Lectures on the History of Philosophy,
vol. 3, p. 253: “It was no arbitrary choice that led [Spinoza] to occupy himself with light, for it
represents in the material sphere the absolute identity which forms the foundation of the Oriental
view of things.” Italics added. I would like to thank Dina Emundts, Eckart Förster, Zach Garten-
berg, and Sally Sedgwick for their most helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. An
early version of the paper was presented at the 2017 meeting of the Hegel Society of Great Britain
at Oxford University, and I would like to thank the audience for their questions and comments. I
am particularly indebted to Bob Stern and Stephen Houlgate for helpful conversations after my
talk.
 In passing, let me note that Spinoza himself was not free from similar prejudices. See, for ex-
ample, his remark about Islam in the preface to the Theological Political Treatise (III/7/4). Unless
otherwise marked, all quotes from Spinoza’s works and letters are from Curley’s translation. I
have relied on Gebhardt’s critical edition (cited by volume/page/line) for the Latin and Dutch
text of Spinoza. I use the following standard abbreviations for Spinoza’s works: CM – Metaphys-
ical Thoughts [Cogitata Metaphysica], KV – Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being [Korte
Verhandeling van God de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand], Ep. – Letters.
 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3, p. 257. This praise is, in part, double-edged;
Spinoza is indeed where philosophy should begin, yet in order to unfold, it must go beyond Spi-
noza.
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and then [secondly, in] raising it to a higher standpoint on the strength of its own resources
[daß aber zweitens dieser Standpunkt aus sich selbst auf den höheren gehoben werde].⁵
Hegel’s requirement to meet the opponent on his own ground sets a high stan-
dard for philosophical polemics. We can, for example, envision a more modest
criterion according to which both sides of the debate must establish a commonly
agreed upon set of ground rules for the debate.⁶ However, as we will shortly see,
it is questionable whether Hegel observed even this more modest criterion for
philosophical polemics.
The current paper will focus on only one aspect of the philosophical encoun-
ter between Spinoza and Hegel: the question of the reality of time.⁷ The precise
reconstruction of the debate will require a close examination of Spinoza’s con-
cept of tempus (time) and duratio (duration), and Hegel’s understanding of
these notions. As we shall shortly see, ‘tempus,’ for Spinoza, does not mean pre-
cisely what we (and, may I hint, Hegel) mean by this term.
In the first part of the paper, I will present and discuss Hegel’s perception of
Spinoza as a modern Eleatic, who denies the reality of time, change and plural-
ity. The issue of the reality of time and change in Spinoza is central to Hegel’s
reading of Spinoza, as it undergirds his claim that Spinoza’s system lacks life
and is incapable of advancing beyond the absolute unity of being. In the second
part, I will look closely at some of Spinoza’s texts (especially his celebrated “Let-
ter on the Infinite”), and show that Hegel was wrong in reading Spinoza as de-
nying the reality of duration and change. I will also point out the passages that
may have led Hegel (and others) to this erroneous conclusion. Ironically, Hegel’s
misreading of Spinoza as denying the reality of duration and change has been
compensated for by a reading of Hegel as denying the reality of time by one
of Hegel’s most prominent followers, John Ellis McTaggart. In the third and
final section, I will discuss McTaggart’s reading of Hegel as relegating time
and temporality to the less fundamental layers of reality.
 Hegel, Science of Logic (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 12), p. 15.
 For a very elegant illustration of this second attitude, see Hawley, “Identity and Discernibil-
ity.”
 I discuss another aspect of Hegel’s reading of Spinoza as an acosmist, i.e., the reality of
modes, in my “Acosmism or Weak Individuals?”.
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1 Hegel on Spinoza’s Eleaticism
The historical location of Spinoza in the early modern period does not fit well
within the context of Hegel’s scheme of the unfolding of the history of philoso-
phy. Truly, says Hegel, Spinoza does not belong to the modern world, which is
constituted by the appreciation of the individual “through the agency of Christi-
anity.”⁸ Spinoza, in contrast, has no place for individuality, and his philosophy is
nothing but an impressive, yet anachronistic, reappearance of ancient Eleatic
monism.
Taken as a whole this constitutes the Idea of Spinoza, and it is just what was ‘tò ón’ to the
Eleatics […]. Spinoza is far from having proved this unity as convincingly as was done by
the ancients; but what constitutes the grandeur of Spinoza’s manner of thought is that he is
able to renounce all that is determinate and particular, and restrict himself to the One, giv-
ing heed to this alone.⁹
The view of Spinoza as a modern Eleatic (a paradoxical term for Hegel) appears
also in Hegel’s Science of Logic:
The being of the Eleatics or the Spinozistic substance are only the abstract negations of all
determinateness,without ideality being posited in them – in the case of Spinoza […] infinity
is only the absolute affirmation of a thing, consequently only the unmoved unity.¹⁰
This last, brief extract may perhaps provide us with some insight into Hegel’s
reasons for viewing Spinoza as denying the reality of movement and particular-
ity (i.e. the reason for the affirmation of “only the unmoved unity”). At the begin-
ning of the Ethics, Spinoza notes that “being finite is really, in part, a negation
and being infinite is an absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature.”¹¹
What Spinoza presumably had in mind by this claim is that whenever we refer to
any given x as finite, we thereby deny some existence (the existence of whatever
is not x) of x.¹² In other words, in order for an existing thing x to be limited, it
must be limited by another existing thing; it cannot be limited by that which
 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3, p. 258.
 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3, pp. 257–258.
 Hegel, Science of Logic (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 21), p. 148. Italics added.
 Ethics, Part I, Prop. 8, Schol. 1: “[Cum] finitum esse revera sit ex parte negatio, et infinitum
absoluta affirmatio existentiae alicujus naturae.”
 See Ethics, Part I, Def. 2: “That thing is said to be finite in its own kind that can be limited by
another of the same nature.”
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does not exist.¹³ This claim of Spinoza is the closest he comes to asserting the
“determinatio negatio est” formula in the Ethics.¹⁴ Hegel admired this formula,
and thought that Spinoza did not properly appreciate the importance of his
own finding.¹⁵ In the above short extract from the Science of Logic, Hegel
seems to reason that insofar as Spinoza’s God is absolutely infinite, it cannot
be limited (a valid inference which Spinoza clearly affirms), and that Spinoza
would have to deny that God has, or can have, any genuine determinations or
qualities (a conclusion that Spinoza would reject).¹⁶ Were the Spinozist God to
have attribute y – Hegel presumably reasoned – this would thereby deprive
God of whatever existence that is not y. From the claim that God has no genuine
determinations, Hegel seems to infer that Spinoza’s God is unmoving or un-
changing, insofar as change is movement from one determination to another.¹⁷
Now, Spinoza, of course, adheres to the Law of Non-Contradiction and
would readily agree that neither God, nor any other being, may be the subject
of both y and not-y. But he would deny that because God has one attribute,
say extension, it cannot have any other attribute. After all, Spinoza defines
God as a substance consisting of infinitely many attributes (Ethics, Part I,
Def. 6). For Spinoza, each attribute is conceptually and causally independent
of all other attributes,¹⁸ and his construal of the conceptual barrier between
the attributes is so robust that it precludes even a negative conceptual relation
among the attribute, i.e., the instantiation of attribute x in God (or any other pre-
 Moreover, it must be limited by something which shares its nature (Ethics, Part I, Def. 2).
 The “determinatio negatio est” formula appears in Ep. 50 of Spinoza (IV/240/14).
 Hegel, Lecture on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3, pp. 286–287. For a detailed discussion of
the “determinatio negatio est” formula and its meaning in Spinoza and Hegel, see Melamed,
“Omnis determinatio est negatio.”
 The core issue at stake is how one understands the “determinatio negatio est” formula. In
my, “Omnis determinatio est negatio,” I spell out Hegel’s and Spinoza’s opposed interpretations
of this formula.
 For Hegel, the determinations of attributes and modes are merely artificially inserted into
Spinoza’s system, without showing how the concept of God, or the substance, unfolds into its
opposite determinations. Hegel is right in criticizing Spinoza for not proving adequately that Ex-
tension and Thought are attributes. However, the main engine of Hegel’s logic – the unfolding
through self-negation and sublation – could not be accepted by Spinoza due to his strict adher-
ence to the Law of Non-Contradiction.
 See Ethics, Part I, Prop. 10: “Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself,”
and Ethics, Part II, Prop. 6: “The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as
he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered
under any other attribute.”
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sumptive substance) cannot provide a reason for the non-instantiation of any
other attribute, y, in the same substance.¹⁹
The second definition of Part One of the Ethics reads: “That thing is said to
be finite in its own kind that can be limited by another of the same nature.” Had
Spinoza affirmed that the attributes share some common kind, or nature, Hegel
would be right to insist that diverse attributes limit each other, and that as a re-
sult Spinoza must renounce ascribing any determinations to God. As far as I
know, Spinoza never provided a definition of what constitutes a genuine kind
[genus] or nature. Yet, the foundations of his ontology leave no room for the ex-
istence of a meta-nature, shared by all the attributes: were the attributes to share
any genuine common nature, this common nature would allow us to (partly)
conceive one attribute through another, and the conceptual barrier between
the attributes would collapse.²⁰
Hegel’s view of Spinoza as a modern Eleatic is not merely a critique, as he
expresses genuine admiration of what he takes to be Spinoza’s position:
Spinoza makes the sublime demand on thought that it consider everything under the form of
eternity, sub specie aeterni, that is, as it is in the absolute. But in an absolute which is only
an unmoved identity, the attribute, like the mode, is only as disappearing, not as becom-
ing.²¹
For Hegel, Spinoza’s ability to gaze at things sub specie aeternitatis is truly sub-
lime. There is no doubt to my mind that for Hegel – just as for many other deep
thinkers – the Sirens of Elea proved to be highly seductive.²² Perhaps for this rea-
son he felt the need to constantly remind his readers (and himself) that Spinoza’s
alleged denial of change and becoming is one-sided, and must be corrected so as
to allow for genuine life, change, and multiplicity.²³
Before we turn to examine Spinoza’s actual views on the reality of change
and temporality, let me note briefly that Hegel’s view of Spinoza as a modern El-
 See Della Rocca, “Spinoza’s Substance Monism,” pp. 28–29.
 This investigation can be pushed further by raising the objection that in Ethics, Part I, Def. 6,
Exp. Spinoza asserts that of something that is merely infinite in its own kind (i.e., the attributes)
“we can deny infinite attributes from it” (presumably, all the other attributes). I have to reserve
this exploration for another occasion, as it would take us aside from our main topic.
 Hegel, Science of Logic (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 11), p. 377.
 See McTaggart, “Unreality of Time,” p. 457: “In all ages the belief in the unreality of time has
proved singularly attractive.”
 For further texts in which Hegel describes Spinoza as denying the reality of becoming and
change, see Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3, pp. 288–289, 515–516, and Lectures
on the Proofs of the Existence of God, pp. 142– 144.
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eatic was developed partly in response to Jacobi’s assertion that “in Spinoza du-
ration [Dauer] is mere illusion [Wahn].”²⁴ In his early essay, Faith and Knowledge
(1802– 1803), Hegel expresses astonishment at Jacobi’s attempt to refute Spinoza
by (Jacobi’s) showing that Spinoza’s version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
does not allow for the reality of time.²⁵ With such a “refutation,” claims Hegel,
Jacobi was just bursting through an open door.
The doctrine of the absolute simul [Das absolute Zugleich], the doctrine that God is not the
transient [vorübergehende] cause, but the eternal cause of things, and that things outside
God [außer Gott]²⁶ are nothing in themselves, and hence things in time and time itself are
nothing – every line of Spinoza’s system makes the proposition that time and succession
[Zeit und Succesion] are mere appearance so utterly trivial that not the slightest trace of nov-
elty and paradox is to be seen in it. Jacobi cites Spinoza’s conviction that “everything must
be considered solely secundum modum quo a rebus aeternis fluit [according to the mode in
which it flows from eternal things]” and that “time, measure, number must be considered
as kinds of idea abstracted from this mode, and hence, as entities of the imagination
[Wesen der Einbildung].”²⁷ So how could the proposition that succession is mere appear-
ance not belong to Spinoza? ²⁸
The passage that both Jacobi and Hegel refer to appears in Spinoza’s celebrated
“Letter on the Infinite,” and the precise explanation of this very passage will be
our primary task in the next part of the paper. We will begin, however, with a
brief explication of the Ethics’ definitions of eternity [aeternitas] and duration
[duratio].
2 Spinoza on Aeternitas, Duratio, and Tempus.
At the beginning of Parts One and Two of the Ethics, Spinoza presents the follow-
ing definitions of eternity and duration:
Ethics, Part I, Def. 8: By ETERNITY I understand existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to
follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing.
Exp.: For such existence, like the essence of a thing, is conceived as an eternal truth, and
on that account cannot be explicated by duration or time, even if the duration is conceived
 Jacobi, Main Philosophical Writings, p. 188 (Jacobi, Werke, I/1, p. 20).
 Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, p. 106.
 Trivially, for Spinoza, “things outside God” are nothing, since “Whatever is, is in God” (Eth-
ics, Part I, Prop. 15).
 Jacobi, Main Philosophical Writings, p. 371 (Jacobi, Werke, I/1, p. 257), cf. p. 290.
 Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, p. 106 (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4, p. 353–354). Italics added.
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to be without beginning or end [proptereaque per durationem, aut tempus explicari non
potest, tametsi duratio principio, et fine carere concipiatur].²⁹
Ethics, Part II, Def. 5: DURATION is an indefinite continuation of existence [Duratio est in-
definita existendi continuatio].
Exp.: I say indefinite because it cannot be determined at all through the very nature of the
existing thing, nor even by the efficient cause, which necessarily posits the existence of the
thing, and does not take it away.
In earlier studies, I have argued that, for Spinoza, (divine) eternity has little to do
with any kind of temporality – not even Platonic atemporality – but that it is in
fact a modal notion: the necessity (or necessary existence) of that which exists
solely by virtue of its essence.³⁰ For Spinoza, all things – the porcupine and my
idea of the porcupine included – exist by necessity, but it is only God whose nec-
essary existence is due to its essence, while the porcupine and my idea of the
porcupine exist necessarily by virtue of their external causes.³¹ Eternity in this
strict sense of self-necessitated existence belongs only to God (and its attrib-
utes³²). Yet, Spinoza is willing to use ‘eternity’ in a second and weaker sense –
which denotes infinite duration – as long as we take care to ascribe this kind
of second-best eternity only to modes, and not to God.³³
In sharp contrast to eternity, duration is the existence of things which exist
not by virtue of their essence (or what is the same: their nature), but rather by
virtue of their efficient cause. Spinoza makes this point in the explicatio of the
definition of duration, and adds that the efficient cause of a mode “necessarily
posits the existence of the thing, and does not take it away.” This last claim is
closely related to Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, according to which the essence
of modes makes them always strive to persevere in their being, and that the es-
sence of modes cannot cause their destruction. Therefore, the destruction (i.e.,
the termination of their duration) can only result from their encounter with ex-
ternal causes.³⁴
 Italics added.
 See Melamed, “Spinoza’s Deification of Existence,” and “Eternity in Early Modern Philoso-
phy,” pp. 149– 163.
 See Ethics, Part I, Prop. 33, Schol. 1: “A thing is called necessary either by reason of its es-
sence or by reason of its cause. For a thing’s existence follows necessarily either from its essence
and definition or from a given efficient cause” (II/74/6–8). Cf. Garrett, “Spinoza’s Necessitarian-
ism.”
 See Ethics, Part I, Prop. 19.
 See CM I.10 (I/270/17–25). Cf. Melamed, “Eternity in Early Modern Philosophy,” pp. 160– 161.
 See Ethics, Part III, Props. 4–6. As far as I can see, the conatus doctrine does not apply to
God, insofar as the existence of God is his essence. Thus, to say that God strives to persevere in
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Spinoza does not define ‘tempus’ in the Ethics, yet we can point out as a clear
pattern that most, if not all, of the mentions of ‘tempus’ in the Ethics are in the
context of the activity of the imagination,which for Spinoza constitutes the lower
kind of cognition, and the only source of inadequate ideas.³⁵ We find a more de-
tailed analysis of time and temporality in Spinoza’s celebrated “Letter on the In-
finite.”
The “Letter of the Infinite” is a fascinating, yet dense, text in which Spinoza
unfolds the outlines of his ontology in the course of explaining his “discoveries
about the Infinite.”³⁶ Though the letter is quite early (dated April 20th, 1663), it is
a crucial source for understanding Spinoza’s metaphysical theory even in his
very late period, as we know that Spinoza circulated copies of this letter
among friends even in his late period.³⁷ We have no evidence of a similar attitude
by Spinoza toward any other letter, and it is thus no surprise that both Jacobi and
Hegel were deeply intrigued by this letter.³⁸
Spinoza begins the letter by drawing three distinctions regarding the infin-
ite: (1) between that which is infinite by virtue of its essence and that which is
infinite by virtue of its cause; (2) between that which has no limit and that
which cannot be equated with any number, though we know its maximum
and minimum; and finally, (3) between “what we can only understand, but
not imagine, and what we can also imagine.”³⁹ It is the latter distinction that
will interest us primarily here.
being is just like saying that the number two “strives to be an even number.” In Propositions 8
and 9 of Part III, Spinoza makes clear that the striving of each thing involves indefinite duration
(or time) which is the kind of existence of modes, but not of God.
 See, for example, Ethics, Part II, Prop. 44, Schol. (II/125/26 and 126/5). In Ethics, Part II, Prop.
17, Cor. Spinoza explains the generation of our notion of the present as the work of the imagina-
tion (II/105/20). For Spinoza’s distinction between the three kinds of cognition, see Ethics, Part
II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.
 Ep. 12 (IV/52/25).
 See Eps. 81 (IV/331/10) and 81 (IV/332/7). Currently, we have three variants of the Letter on the
Infinite: the version which appeared in Spinoza’s 1677 Opera Posthuma, a Dutch version which
was part of the Nagelate Schriften, the early Dutch translation of Spinoza’s works which ap-
peared simultaneously with the Opera Pothuma, and finally, a copy of the letter made by Leib-
niz.
 For Jacobi’s discussion of the letter, see Main Philosophical Writings, pp. 217 n. 28 and 371
(Jacobi, Werke, I/1, pp. 94 n. 1 and 254). Hegel discusses the letter quite extensively. See, for ex-
ample, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3, pp. 261–263; Science of Logic (Gesammelte
Werke, vol. 21), p. 247; Encyclopedia Logic, § 104, Addition 2; Faith & Knowledge, pp. 106–112.
 Ep. 12 (IV/53/2–9). Presumably, the three distinctions are not orthogonal, i.e., they divide re-
ality along the same lines (though this is not absolutely clear).
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Following the three distinctions, Spinoza introduces the key terminology of
his ontology.We will focus on his distinction between substance and mode, and
between eternity and duration.
I call the Affections of Substance Modes. Their definition, insofar as it is not the very def-
inition of Substance [quatenus non est ipsa substantiae definitio], cannot involve any exis-
tence. So even though they exist, we can conceive them as not existing. From this it follows
that when we attend only to the essence of modes, and not to the order of the whole of
Nature, we cannot infer from the fact that they exist now that they will or will not exist
later, or that they have or have not existed earlier. From this it is clear that we conceive
the existence of Substance to be entirely different from the existence of Modes.
The difference between Eternity and Duration arises from this. For it is only of Modes that we
can explicate⁴⁰ the existence by Duration. But [we can explicate the existence] of Substance
by Eternity, i.e., the infinite enjoyment of existing, or (in bad Latin) of being.⁴¹
Two observations are in order here. Firstly, the passage suggests a clear bifurca-
tion between the existence of modes and that of substance, and it is this bifur-
cation which is the ground of the difference between eternity and duration. The
substance’s essence involves existence and thus substance is eternal. In con-
trast, the essence of modes does not involve existence, and thus their manner
of existence is durational rather than eternal. Secondly, upon a closer reading,
the distinction between substance and modes appears somewhat subtler. Notice
that at the beginning of the passage Spinoza seems to qualify the claim that the
definition of modes does not involve existence by noting that this is so “insofar
as [the definition of mode] is not the very definition of substance.” Does this
qualification imply that if we were to define or conceive the modes through
the very definition (or essence) of substance, their essence would involve exis-
tence? At this point, I would leave this possibility as a mere suggestion. Shortly,
we will see that in the Ethics, Spinoza claims just that.
Let us turn now to the passage in the “Letter on the Infinite” which appears,
prima facie, to strongly support the reading of Spinoza as denying the reality of
modes, and thus also duration.
But if you ask why we are so inclined, by a natural impulse, to divide extended substance, I
reply that we conceive quantity in two ways: either abstractly, or superficially, as we have it
 I amend here Curley’s translation of “explicare” as “explain,” since it seems that Spinoza is
not looking here for the causes which explain existence (the cause of the existence of a mode is
another mode, not “duration”), but rather addresses the two opposite manners of explicating, or
spelling out, existence.
 Ep. 12 (IV/54/9–55/3). Italics added.
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in the imagination with the aid of the senses; or as substance,which is done by the intellect
alone. So, if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which is what we do most
often and most easily, we find it to be divisible, finite, composed of parts, and one of
many. But if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and perceive the thing as it is in itself,
which is very difficult, then we find it to be infinite, indivisible and unique, as I have al-
ready demonstrated sufficiently to you before now.⁴²
For Spinoza, divisibility pertains to modes, and modes only: substance is indivi-
sible.⁴³ In arguing that when quantity is conceived by the intellect it is conceived
as an infinite, indivisible, and unique substance,while the imagination conceives
quantity as divisible, finite, and composed of parts, Spinoza seems to affirm that
modes, insofar as they are divisible, are merely cognitions of the imagination.
Since the imagination, for Spinoza, is the source of inadequate cognition, it
would seem that by their very nature modes are the result of inadequate and
false cognition.⁴⁴
The last conclusion, arguably, was reached somewhat too fast. Recall that at
the beginning of the “Letter on the Infinite” Spinoza draws a distinction “be-
tween what we can only understand, but not imagine, and what we can also
imagine.” The passage we just discussed makes clear that substance is “what
we can only understand, but not imagine,”⁴⁵ but what are the things which
we can both understand and imagine? Are they not the modes? Indeed, if we
look again at the long passage just quoted, we would see that while the passage
states that the substance is conceived by the intellect, it does not exclude the
possibility of conceiving modes by the intellect as well. In order to confirm
the claim that modes can be conceived either by the imagination or the intellect,
let us turn to the immediately succeeding passage in the same letter.
Next, from the fact that when we conceive Quantity abstracted from Substance and sepa-
rate Duration from the way it flows from eternal things [quo a rebus aeternis fluit, separa-
mus], we can determine them as we please, there arise Time [Tempus] and Measure [Men-
 Ep. 12 (IV/56/5–15).
 See Ethics, Part I, Prop. 12, Prop. 13, Prop. 15, Schol. (II/59/34) and KV I.2 (I/26/8– 16). Cf. Mel-
amed, “Spinoza’s Mereology,” § 2. The passage above does not explicitly refer to modes, but
since it contrasts the conception of quantity as divisible with the conception of quantity as sub-
stance, it would seem that the former conception of quantity is qua modes.
 This point is spelled out elegantly in Della Rocca (“Review of Melamed,” p. 296): “Since di-
vision is a function of the imagination, and since, for Spinoza, the imagination is the domain of
inadequate, confused and not true ideas, it seems that to see reality in terms of divisible modes
is, for Spinoza, to fail to grasp the way the world really is.”
 Were we to imagine substance, we would perceive it as divisible, but since substance by its
nature is indivisible, this would not be possible.
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sura] – Time to determine Duration and Measure to determine Quantity in such a way that,
so far as possible, we imagine them easily. Again, from the fact that we separate the Affec-
tions of Substance from Substance itself [quòd Affectiones Substantiae ab ipsa Substantiâ
separamus] and reduce them to classes so that as far as possible we imagine them easily,
arises Number, by which we determine [these affections of substance]. You can see clearly
from what I have said that Measure, Time, and Number are nothing but Modes of thinking,
or rather, of imagining.⁴⁶
Measure, time, and number are for Spinoza nothing but entia rationis, or rather,
auxiliaries of the imagination [imaginationis auxiliis].⁴⁷ They are useful fictions
which help us navigate the world, but they are also misleading notions which
appear to us as belonging to the real furniture of the world, while truly they
are mere abstractions. In the passage above, Spinoza describes the abstraction
process through which these notions are generated.
The first step in this abstraction process is “separating Duration from the
way it flows from eternal things.”⁴⁸ This assertion alone provides very strong evi-
dence for the reality of duration (though not time) in Spinoza. Spinoza does not
claim that “duration is conceived as following from eternal things” in which case
we could still wonder whether this conception is adequate or not, but rather sim-
ply and categorically asserts that duration flows from eternal things.⁴⁹ Moreover,
the process of separating duration from its ground in eternity is described in this
passage as equivalent to abstraction, an activity typical of the imagination. This
confirms again that truly (i.e., without the abstraction performed by the imagi-
nation), duration is tightly grounded in eternity, and thus must be real.
The passage continues by describing the manner in which tempus “arises” to
determine duration (after it has been separated from eternity) as analogous to
the rise of Measure to determine quantity. Presumably, tempus, for Spinoza, is
 Ep. 12 (IV/56/16–57/6). Italics added.
 Ep. 12 (IV/57/18 and 58/17). On Spinoza’s view of mathematics as a systematic science of non-
entities, see Melamed, “The Exact Science of Non-Beings.”
 By “eternal things,” in plural, Spinoza refers here to natura naturans, or the realm of the in-
finitely many attributes. At the time of Ep. 12, the distinction between God and its attributes had
not been fully developed, as is attested by the fact that the crucial distinction between “absolute
infinity” and “infinity in its own kind” is not mentioned at all in this letter, whose main subject
is the infinite. The term ‘attribute’ is not at all mentioned in this letter as well.
 The relation of flowing from, or following from, is just the kind of causation Spinoza calls
“immanent causation.” It is the sub-species of efficient causation which obtains when the effect
inheres in the cause. Cf. Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, pp. 61–66 and 121– 122.
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just duration measured by days, years, seconds, and other units.⁵⁰ The measure
of duration helps us imagine it much more easily. Yet, if we reify durational units
and treat them as real beings, we engage in fictional ontology. In this sense, Ja-
cobi’s and Hegel’s claims that time is a mere fiction in Spinoza are trivially true,
provided that we make it clear that the fictivity of tempus may well leave dura-
tion (and change) real. In other words, Jacobi and Hegel seem to be equivocating
in their use of the term ‘time [Zeit]’ between the sense Spinoza ascribes to ‘tem-
pus’ (i.e., measured, abstracted duration), and the more frequent sense of the
term as we normally use it. In order to establish that Spinoza denied the reality
of time in the latter sense, Jacobi and Hegel should have shown that not only tem-
pus, but also duratio, are imaginary for Spinoza. Alas, as we have just observed,
this very paragraph of the “Letter on the Infinite” asserts that duration is part of
the real furniture of the world, insofar as it flows from eternity.
Further support for the claim that Spinoza’s modes are real comes from the
penultimate sentence in the last quote from the “Letter on the Infinite.” The sen-
tence describes the manner in which the imagination generates our conception
of number. First, “we separate the Affections of Substance from Substance itself.”
Thus, we have here a clear confirmation that without the separating activity of
the imagination, modes are truly in the substance, and thus are real. In the sec-
ond step in the production of our conception of number, the imagination arrang-
es the (abstracted) modes in classes (“human beings, “rhinos,” “things,” etc.).
Numbers allow us to greatly compress the detailed information we experience
about each abstracted item by simply describing the class as “x number of ϕ
things” (e.g., “seven penguins”).
That modes and change are truly inseparable from substance (and thus that
both are real) we can see also from another passage in the “Letter on the Infin-
ite” in which Spinoza argues that if one conceives the extended substance with-
out any motion, “he will certainly be striving for nothing but depriving [privare]
corporeal Substance (which we cannot conceive except as existing) of its Affections
and bringing it about that it does not have the nature which it has.”⁵¹ The argu-
ment in this last passage is a certain variant of modus tollens. Insofar as the
modes (and motion) follow necessarily from the nature of substance,⁵² were
the modes not to be instantiated (or even, were different modes instantiated),
the substance’s nature would have to be other than how it actually is (since
 Unlike Descartes,who follows Aristotle in defining tempus as the measure of movement, Spi-
noza defines tempus as the measure of duration. See Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, I.57 (AT
VIIIA; CSM I, p. 212).
 Ep. 12 (IV/60/13– 15). Italics added.
 See Ethics, Part I, Prop. 16 and its demonstration.
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from the actual nature of substance, the actual modes must necessarily follow).⁵³
Now, for Spinoza, the nature (or essence) of substance is absolutely necessary.
Therefore, the actual modes cannot fail to exist. Note further that in the sentence
above Spinoza refers to the possibility of not having the actual modes, as “de-
priving substance of its affections,” which again stresses that the affections
(and their motion) truly belong to substance.
At the beginning of our discussion of the “Letter on the Infinite,” I raised the
suggestion that even the modes might be in some sense eternal, if we conceive
them through “the very definition of substance.” This suggestion is confirmed by
two key passages in the Ethics.
The first passage appears in the Scholium to Proposition 45 of Part II of the
Ethics. Proposition 45 asserts that each idea of each singular thing (i.e. mode) in-
volves God’s eternal and infinite essence. Following the demonstration of this
proposition, Spinoza notes:
By existence here I do not understand duration, i.e., existence insofar as it is conceived ab-
stractly, and as a certain species of quantity. ⁵⁴ For I am speaking of the very nature of ex-
istence, which is attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow from
the eternal necessity of God’s nature in infinitely many modes (see Part I, Prop. 16). I am
speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God. For even
if each one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the
force by which each one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of
God’s nature.
The topic of the passage is the existence of singular things, i.e., modes. Notice
Spinoza’s insistence that he is speaking here not of duration but rather “of the
very nature of existence,” i.e., of the innermost kind of existence, which is clear-
ly eternity. Modes can be conceived as eternal once we consider them, not as in
any way independent, but rather “as they are in God.” When we conceive of
modes in this manner, we really conceive of God, and God’s existence is eternity.
Thus, conceived or defined by the very definition of substance, the modes are
eternal.
The second passage appears in the context of Spinoza’s discussion of mind
and eternity at the end of the Ethics. In Proposition 30 of Part V, Spinoza pro-
vides an example of a conception of a certain mode – the human mind – “inso-
far as it is in God.”
 Spinoza presents a very similar argument in Ethics, Part I, Prop. 33, demonstration.
 Existence conceived “as a certain species of quantity” is, in fact, tempus. Recall that Spinoza
defines duration as an “indefinite continuation of existence” (Ethics, Part II, Def. 5; italics
added).
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Insofar as our Mind knows itself and the Body under a species of eternity, it necessarily has
knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.
Demonstration: Eternity is the very essence of God insofar as this involves necessary exis-
tence (by Part I, Def. 8). To conceive things under a species of eternity, therefore, is to con-
ceive things insofar as they are conceived through God’s essence, as real beings, or insofar as
through God’s essence they involve existence. Hence, insofar as our Mind conceives itself and
the Body under a species of eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows, etc.,
q.e.d.⁵⁵
Notice the phrase in italics in the demonstration. When we conceive a mode –
here, the human mind – through God’s essence, the mode is really defined by
the definition of substance, and to that extent the mode involves existence,
i.e., it is eternal.
Let us provide a tentative summary. In this part of the paper, we have scruti-
nized Spinoza’s claims about the reality of duration and modes. I have argued
that, upon close examination, both the “Letter on the Infinite” and the Ethics af-
firm the reality of duration and modes. Hegel and Jacobi were trivially right in
claiming that for Spinoza tempus is imaginary, but this claim is far from estab-
lishing the unreality of change, plurality, and duration in Spinoza.
3 Hegel, McTaggart and the Reality of Time (or
Spinoza’s Long Arm)
At least at first sight, Hegel appears to be the philosopher one could hardly sus-
pect of denying the reality of time. History – both world history and, even more
so, the history of philosophy – plays an absolutely central role in his system. In
his philosophy of nature, time itself is presented by Hegel as one of the most im-
portant manifestations of the Concept.⁵⁶ We should thus be quite surprised to
find an important interpretation of Hegel which suggest that for Hegel time
does not take part in the ultimate layer of reality. In this part, I will discuss
J. E. McTaggart’s intriguing arguments for the atemporality of the Science of
Logic.
In his seminal article of 1908, “The Unreality of Time,” McTaggart presented
a powerful argument in favor of the claim that fundamental reality neither con-
 Italics added.
 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature [Encyclopedia, Part II], §§ 257–259.
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tains temporality nor provides proper grounding for temporal relations.⁵⁷ This
was not, however, McTaggart’s first attempt to prove the unreality of time.⁵⁸ In
his 1896 book Studies in Hegelian Dialectic – a revision of his Cambridge disser-
tation – McTaggart unveils a series of arguments aiming to show that Hegel’s
logic is essentially atemporal, and that as a result we should understand Hegel’s
philosophy as banning time from its ultimate layer of reality.
At the beginning of the fifth chapter of Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, McTag-
gart poses a fundamental dilemma.
One of the more interesting and important questions which can arise in connection with
Hegel’s philosophy is the question of the relation between the succession of the categories
and the succession of events in time. Are we to regard the complex and concrete Absolute
Idea, in which alone true reality is to be found, as gradually growing up in time by evolution
of one category to another? Or are we to regard the Absolute as existing eternally in its full
completeness, and the succession of events in time as something which has no part as such
in any ultimate system of the universe?⁵⁹
The extract above gives us clear indication of the nature of McTaggart’s proof
strategy. He is not about to deny that time has some place in Hegel’s system,
rather he will argue that Hegel is committed to the existence of multilayered re-
ality, so that it is only the concrete Absolute Idea which emerges at the very end
of the Logic of the Concept (and thus, the conclusion of the entire Science of
Logic) can justly claim to be “true reality” and “the ultimate system of the uni-
verse.” In this true and ultimate reality, time and succession has no place.
McTaggart’s interpretation not only allows for the presence of time in the less
fundamental layers of reality, but he even openly admits that “Hegel certainly
explains the past to some extent by bringing the successive events under succes-
sive categories.” “Nevertheless,” – claims McTaggart – “it seems to me that such
a view is incompatible with the system. There are doubtless difficulties in either
interpretation of Hegel’s meaning, but there seems no doubt that we must reject
the development of the process in time.”⁶⁰
 By the last point I have in mind McTaggart’s claim that insofar as the A-series is unreal, the
attempt to ground the B-series in a conjunction of the A-series and the C-series fails (McTaggart,
“Unreality of Time,” p. 463).
 In the 1908 article, McTaggart notes that his reasons for rejecting the reality of time were not
employed by any previous philosopher, Hegel included (p. 31). There are, however, some fea-
tures shared by both the 1896 and the 1908 texts, such as the view of reality as having various
layers.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 140. Italics added.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 140.
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In order to establish these claims, McTaggart develops two chief arguments,
and then offers textual support in defense of the view that Hegel’s “absolute idea
exists eternally in its full perfection,” and that the process which unfolds in the
Science of Logic is a mere reconstruction, rather than construction.⁶¹
Though each of the two arguments has several side proofs, we can recon-
struct the core of the first argument in the following manner.
1. “[Hegel maintains that] the universe is fully rational.”⁶²
(Premise)
2. If the Absolute Idea evolves in time, the process must be either finite or in-
finite.
(Premise)
3. Time is in itself infinite and empty, i.e., indifferent to its content.⁶³
(Premise)
4. The process cannot be infinite, because (i) it will constitute a “false infinity”
of endless aggregation which Hegel rejects, and (ii) the evolution of the Ab-
solute Idea in the Science of Logic is a process with a clear beginning and
end, and if any of the steps in this evolution would take infinite time,
“there would be no process at all.”
5. The process cannot be finite, since in such a case the first event/category (i)
would appear ex nihilo (contrary to (1)), and (ii) the temporal location of the
first category in empty time would be arbitrary (contrary to (1)).
6. Therefore, the evolution cannot be in time, since it cannot take either infinite
or finite duration (from 2, 4, and 5)
The first premise seems to be a variant of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.⁶⁴
The second premise is essentially a tautology. The third premise is more or
less an affirmation of the Newtonian concept of time. The obvious question is
whether Hegel accepts Newton’s theory of time. Perhaps in order to establish
this point, McTaggart cites Hegel’s claim in §257 of the Encyclopedia that “time
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 140.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 141, p. 158 (in the 1922 edition).
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 142, pp. 159– 160: “To fix any point in time is to
imply the existence upon both sides of it […]. Time is in itself quite empty and indifferent to
its content.”
 Though the strength of McTaggart’s version of the PSR is somewhat clear, as he notes: “It is
perhaps not impossible that our minds should form the conception of something on which other
things depend, while it depends itself on nothing. But an event in time could never hold such a
place.” (McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 142, p. 159. Italics added.)
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is still outside itself.”⁶⁵ This brief note, however, falls short of establishing the
claim that time, for Hegel, is empty and infinite. Indeed, in the Addition to
§258 of the Encyclopedia, Hegel seems to take on the Newtonian concept of
time, claiming that “time does not resemble a container in which everything is
as it were borne away and swallowed up in a flow of a stream.”⁶⁶ Be that as it
may, let us consider McTaggart’s derivation of steps (4) and (5).
McTaggart’s first point in support of (4) is that the unfolding of the catego-
ries in Hegel’s logic cannot be a process taking infinite time since Hegel consid-
ers infinite time as an example of the “bad infinity” of the understanding which
Hegel “condemns as a mere mockery of explanation.”⁶⁷ McTaggart’s argument
here seems to be well-grounded in Hegel’s text.⁶⁸ The second claim in support
of (4) is much more interesting philosophically. It begins by reminding the reader
that the unfolding of the dialectic in the Logic has a clear beginning and end,
i.e., “there can be no steps before Pure Being, nor any steps after the Absolute
Idea.”⁶⁹ Next, McTaggart asserts that “the number of steps is finite,” presumably
referring to the Logic’s finite number of categories and transitions. At this point,
McTaggart notes, each step must take either finite or infinite time. If the former,
the entire process cannot take infinite time, since the sum of a finite number of
steps which each take a finite time must be itself finite as well.⁷⁰ If the latter is
true – i.e., some steps take infinite time – the process of the unfolding of the
Absolute Idea can never be completed, since at least some of its steps would
take infinite time.⁷¹
Let us turn now to McTaggart’s attempt to establish (5), i.e., that the process
of the evolution of the Absolute Idea cannot take finite time. McTaggart’s first
consideration in favor of (5) begins by noting that if the entire process is sup-
posed to take a finite time, it must have a specific beginning in time, i.e.,
there must be a certain event e designating the time of the first item of the series
(Pure Being). Per our assumption, e has no precedents. Thus, e would constitute
a causeless event. Yet, “to deny that the first term of such a series requires a de-
termining cause is impossible. It is perhaps not impossible that our minds
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 142, p. 159.
 See Newton, Principia, p. 64: “Absolute, true and mathematics time, in and of itself, and of
its own nature, without reference to anything external, flows uniformly” and Principia, p. 66:
“For time and space are, as it were, the places of themselves and of all things.”
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 141, p. 158.
 See Hegel, Science of Logic (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 21), pp. 129, 136– 138 and 222.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 141, p. 159.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 141, p. 159.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 141, p. 159.
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should form the conception of something on which other things depend, while it
depends itself on nothing. But an event in time could never hold such a place.”⁷²
In other words, just like any other event, e cannot appear ex nihilo.
McTaggart’s second consideration in favor of (5) relies on a familiar argu-
ment from the Leibniz-Clarke exchange of letters. Since, per premise (3), “time
is in itself quite empty and indifferent to its content – no possible reason
could be given why the process should not have begun hundred years later
than it did.”⁷³ In a Newtonian empty time, God cannot have a reason to create
the world at t1 rather than t2.⁷⁴ The very same consideration tells us that even
if – per impossibile – the first category of Hegel’s logic would appear ex nihilo,
the choice of the specific point in time in which the entire process would
begin cannot be explained. Thus, Hegel’s commitment to thoroughgoing ration-
ality would be invalidated. In step (6), McTaggart correctly infers from (2), (4),
and (5), that since the evolution of the Absolute Idea can be neither infinite
nor in finite time, it cannot be in time at all.⁷⁵
I turn now to McTaggart’s second argument against the temporal develop-
ment of the dialectic of the Logic.
If we suppose that the dialectic process came into existence gradually in time,we must sup-
pose that all the contradictions existed at one time or another independently, and before
reconciliation, i. e., as contradictions. […] Such an assertion, however, would be absolutely
untenable. To say that the world consists of reconciled contradictions would produce no dif-
ficulty, for it means nothing more that it consists of things which only appear contrary
when not thoroughly understood. […] All reasoning, and Hegel’s as much as anybody
else’s, involves that two contrary positions cannot both be true. It would be useless to rea-
son, if, when you had demonstrated your conclusion, it was true to assert the opposite of
that conclusion.⁷⁶
The key premise of McTaggart’s argument here seems to be that Hegel wished to
sublate the Law of Non-Contradiction, rather than completely do away with it. As
contradictions arise in the dialectical process we realize that the lower steps of
the dialectic are merely inadequate abstractions which require a reconciliation in
a more concrete term which transcends both sides of the contradiction.⁷⁷ Howev-
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 142, p. 159.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 142, p. 160.
 See Leibniz’s third letter to Clarke, §6 in Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, p. 325.
 McTaggart also explains (6) as a Hegelian sublation of the contradiction between (4) and (5).
See Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 146, p. 164.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 147, p. 165. Italics added.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 147, p. 165.
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er, if this process unfolds in time, every single pair of opposed terms – at the mo-
ment preceding their reconciliation – constitutes a genuine (and not merely appa-
rent) violation of the Law of Non-Contradiction. According to McTaggart, Hegel
accepts the Law of Non-Contradiction and shares the philosophical consensus
that if one allows for genuine (and not merely apparent) contradictions, the
very practice of logical demonstrations becomes pointless.⁷⁸
Not all interpretations of Hegel’s Logic would agree with McTaggart’s claim
that Hegel allows only for apparent, but not genuine, contradictions. Perhaps in
order to address this concern, McTaggart continues with the following sub-argu-
ment.
And again, if contrary propositions could both be true, the special line of argument which
Hegel follows would have lost all its force. We are enabled to pass on from the thesis and
antithesis to the synthesis just because contradictions cannot be true, and the synthesis is
the only way out of it. If the contradictions exist at all, there seems no reason that they should
not continue to do so.⁷⁹
The basic idea of this sub-argument – which is cogent even if one reads Hegel as
allowing genuine contradictions – is that if one allows for a certain contradiction
to obtain at t1, she must allow for the same contradiction at any other time as
well. If the unfolding of the dialectic takes place in time, and if a contradiction
(before its sublation) would thus obtain at t1, there would be no reason for us to
sublate the contradiction in any later time, if we were content with the unsublat-
ed contradiction at t1. Thus, if (1) we consider the dialectic as process spread in
time, and (2) allow for genuine contradictions, the process cannot move any far-
ther beyond the original contradiction.
Following these two intriguing arguments, McTaggart turns to establishing
his claim by pointing out several key passages in Hegel’s writings and lectures
which seem to provide strong support for his reading.⁸⁰ In this context, McTag-
gart also addresses the obvious objection that his reading of Hegel as denying
the reality of time in the ultimate layer of reality is inconsistent with the philo-
sophical significance that Hegel assigns to history:
It is true that, in the Philosophy of Religion, the Philosophy of History and the History of
Philosophy, he explains various successions of events in time as manifestations of the di-
alectic. But this proves nothing as to the fundamental nature of the connection of time with
the universe. The dialectic is the key to all reality, and, therefore whenever we do view reality
 This consensus is not shared by many current paraconsistent logics.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 147, p. 165– 166.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 149, p. 167– 169.
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under the aspect of time, the different categories will appear as manifesting themselves as a
process in time.⁸¹
The categories can be realized in time, claims McTaggart, insofar as they are the
blueprint for everything that is. However, for McTaggart, the Logic is not merely
the blueprint of reality, but also its deeper layer, and in this layer, time takes no
part.⁸²
McTaggart’s talk about “viewing reality under the aspect of time” is obvious-
ly an allusion to Spinoza’s “sub specie aeternitatis.” In my concluding remarks, I
note that McTaggart shared Hegel’s reading of Spinoza as denying the reality of
time. Yet, according to McTaggart, Spinoza was not the sole Eleatic philosopher
of modern times. Once properly understood, claims McTaggart, Hegel’s philoso-
phy follows Spinoza in denying the reality of time in the ultimate ground or layer
of reality.⁸³
Conclusion
McTaggart’s arguments against the temporality of Hegel’s Logic are quite sophis-
ticated and impressive. Regrettably, they have been all but neglected in the
scholarly literature of the past half century. The ill repute of speculative meta-
physics in Anglo-American circles provides at least part of the explanation for
this neglect.⁸⁴ Times have changed however, and metaphysics is no longer an
anathema. While there may well be good, germane reasons for non- (or even
anti‐) metaphysical readings of Hegel,⁸⁵ one cannot avoid the impression that
the still current aversion to metaphysics among Anglo-American Hegel scholars
resembles the anxiety of those feeling hunted long after the hunter has already
left the forest.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 149, p. 167. Italics added.
 McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 149, p. 169. Notice, however, McTaggart’s stress
that the “Logic without the additional elements which occur in Nature and Spirit is a mere ab-
straction” (Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, § 28, p. 29). Cf. Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics, p. 134–5.
 “Hegel regarded the order of time-series as a reflection, though a distorted reflection, of
something in the real nature of the timeless reality.” (McTaggart, “Unreality of Time,” p. 474.)
 Though see Stern’s illuminating discussion of McTaggart as developing a reading of the
Logic as theory of categories, anticipating late twentieth century “non-metaphysical” interpreta-
tions (Hegelian Metaphysics, pp. 117– 142). Stern seems to use ‘metaphysical’ as more or less
equivalent to what he calls “Neo-Platonic idealism” (p. 134).
 Admittedly, this very term – ‘metaphysical readings of Hegel’ – is somewhat vague, though
this is not the place for the required clarification.
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A crucial premise in McTaggart’s interpretation – that Hegel understands re-
ality as multilayered, and that the dialectic of the Logic constitutes the deepest
layer of reality⁸⁶ – has not been critically examined in the current article. The pri-
mary aim of my discussion of McTaggart was to draw attention to his arguments
against the temporality of the Logic. Admittedly, one can accept these arguments
while denying that, for Hegel, the Logic is more fundamentally real than the phi-
losophy of nature and history.
In his 1908 article, McTaggart lists Spinoza and Hegel (along with Kant and
Schopenhauer) as his modern predecessors in denying the reality of time.⁸⁷ Un-
like other figures among the British Idealists, McTaggart never wrote a major
study of Spinoza. Still, his studies of Hegel’s philosophy are replete with vener-
ating allusions to Spinoza, and a quote from the Ethics is inscribed on his grave-
stone.⁸⁸ His reading of Hegel as denying the reality of time closes the circle which
began with Spinoza’s “Letter on the Infinite,” and Hegel’s reading of Spinoza as
asserting that “things in time and time itself are nothing.” From this perspective,
Hegel seems to be just right in claiming that “philosophy is the timeless compre-
hension of everything in general – time included – according to its eternal deter-
mination.”⁸⁹ Indeed, in spite of their significant differences, for all three philos-
ophers the conception of things “sub specie aeternitatis” is nothing short of
sublime.
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